Russia

Although reserve (or field) growth has proved to be an important contributing factor in adding new reserves in mature petroleum basins, it is a poorly understood phenomenon. Although several papers have been published on the U.S. fields, there are only a few publications on fields in other petroleum provinces. This paper explores the reserve growth in the 42 largest West Siberian oil fields that contain about 55% of the basin’s total oil reserves.

The West Siberian oil fields show 13-fold reserve growth 20 years after the discovery year and only about 2-fold growth after the first production year. This difference in growth is attributed to extensive exploration and field delineation activities between discovery and the first production year. Because of the uncertainty in the length of evaluation time and in reported reserves during this initial period, reserve growth based on the first production year is more reliable for model development. However, reserve growth models based both on discovery year and first production year show rapid growth in the first few years and slower growth in the following years. In contrast, the reserve growth patterns for the conterminous United States and offshore Gulf of Mexico show a steady reserve increase throughout the productive lives of the fields. The different reserve booking requirements and the lack of capital investment for improved reservoir management and production technologies in West Siberia are the probable causes for the difference in the growth patterns.

The models based on the first production year predict that the reserve growth potential in the 42 largest oil fields ofWest Siberia for a five-year period (1998–2003) ranges from 270–330 million barrels or 0.34–0.42% per year. For a similar five-year period (1996–2001), models for the conterminous United States predict a growth of 0.54–0.75% per year.

Published in: Natural Resources Research, Volume 12, Issue 2, Pages 105-119
Available from: SpringerLink

This is a tale about energy and power. It describes the geographer Halford Mackinder’s geopolitical theories and compares them with current views outlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Michael T Klare, among others. With a critical approach it also provides a historical account of a Europe that stands in front of an energy struggle so severe that the current world order seems destined to fall. Oil and natural gas, has since the beginning of the 20th century, been used as a geopolitical tool in order to create dependence, control and even sometimes overthrow empires. USA has for example dominated the “protectorates” Europe and Japan by controlling the flow of oil in the Middle East. But this seems to change. It can’t be ruled out that the cities of Europe in the long run will be shrouded in darkness. The background is that Europe’s own deposits of fossil energy are decreasing at such vast speed that almost the entire demand will have to be imported by the year 2020. Awareness of this forecast, and the undertaking to reduce the carbon emissions in accordance with the Kyoto treaty, led to a grand proclamation in March 2007 to reduce the need for fossil fuels. This commitment seems however to be insufficient if independence towards other regions shall be maintained. Only a small part of the demand can be met by domestically produced fuels. Neither will the proposed energy reducing measures increase the energy security. The conclusion is that there is no time to develop new technology in order to save Europe from its difficult situation.

The dependence on Russia will instead grow stronger. The current geopolitical order, where the United States has acted as a military protector and guarantor of the energy security, looks like it is going to fall. The US is bogged down in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars at the same time as Europe’s dependence on energy from the East grows. The US also has economic troubles and their own energy security dilemma. Russia has on the other hand acted with greater self confidence and purposefully built alliances with China, the Middle East and its former republics in Central Asia. Russia may soon dictate the future of Europe with its energy trump card. If Europe keeps its alliance with US and tries to challenge or subjugate Russia into its “unipolar” order it will deepen the risk for conflict. In such a conflict, Moscow has the power to darken and cool down the European room. Since every country is dependent on the dwindling energy resources for their survival, it may escalate into a full blown war. But the new order may be short. Within two decades there will probably be no surplus of energy to export for Russia, or any other nation for that matter. Europe will by then be without it’s own energy resources and simultaneously lose the option to import.

Published in: Linköping University, student thesis, D-level geography
Available from: Linköping University

Oil is a heavily used natural resource with a limited supply. Russia is one of the largest oil producers and the second largest oil exporting country in the world. Many surrounding countries are dependent on Russian energy. Swedish oil import from Russia has grown from 5% to 35% during 2001-2005.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused the Russian oil production to drop by 50%. The production is currently growing again – but how will it develop in the future?

This report studies different scenarios for Russian oil production and export based on three different estimates of how much oil Russia has left today (70, 120 or 170 Gb), combined with estimates about how fast Russia can produce the oil (a depletion rate of 3%, 4.5% or 6%).

In the worst case, Russian oil production and also the oil export will peak very soon or has already done so in 2006. In the best case, a constant export can be held until 2036. It is not likely that the Russian production will increase more than 5-10% over today’s level.

Published in: Uppsala University,
Available from: Global Energy Systems